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The North Shore–Long Island Jewish Health System 
Laboratories serve 15 hospitals and afﬁ  liated regional physi-
cian practices in the New York City metropolitan area, with 
virus testing performed at a central reference laboratory. The 
inﬂ  uenza A pandemic (H1N1) 2009 outbreak began in this 
area on April 24, 2009, and within weeks respiratory virus 
testing increased 7.5 times. In response, laboratory and cli-
ent service workforces were increased, physical plant build-
out was completed, testing paradigms were converted from 
routine screening tests and viral culture to a high-capacity 
molecular assay for respiratory viruses, laboratory informa-
tion system interfaces were built, and same-day epidemio-
logic reports were produced. Daily review by leadership of 
data from emergency rooms, hospital facilities, and the 
Health System Laboratories enabled real-time management 
of unfolding events. The ability of System laboratories to 
rapidly increase to high-volume comprehensive diagnostics, 
including inﬂ  uenza A subtyping, provided key epidemiologic 
information for local and state public health departments.
L
ocal sentinel laboratories are a critical component of 
the Laboratory Response Network, providing frontline 
diagnostics and, in many instances, the initial reporting for 
infectious disease outbreaks. In the event of a major health 
crisis, the responses of a regional clinical laboratory can 
be central to the ability of civic authorities and healthcare 
systems to handle such emergencies. This report describes 
successful steps taken by a hospital-based regional refer-
ence laboratory in response to a 7.5× increase in respiratory 
virus testing during the ﬁ  rst 3 weeks (April 27–May 15, 
2009) of an outbreak of a novel inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1), now 
referred to as inﬂ  uenza A pandemic (H1N1) 2009, in the 
greater New York City metropolitan area.
The North Shore–Long Island Jewish Health System 
(NSLIJHS) is the third largest nonsectarian not-for-proﬁ  t 
health system in the United States and serves Nassau and 
Suffolk Counties, New York, and the Queens and Staten 
Island boroughs of New York City. The NSLIJHS Central 
Laboratories serve 15 hospitals and afﬁ  liated regional phy-
sician practices; virus testing is performed at the Centralized 
Laboratories in the Clinical Virology Laboratory (CVL). 
In the aftermath of the anthrax event of September 2001, 
NSLIJHS developed an extensive system-wide emergency 
preparedness plan to deal with potential biothreat and bio-
terrorism events that could greatly affect a health system. 
This plan was tested, beginning Friday evening, April 24, 
2009, when 20 students 14–17 years of age with symptoms 
of an inﬂ  uenza-like illness sought evaluation at the pedi-
atric emergency room of Schneider Children’s Hospital at 
Long Island Jewish Medical Center, one of the hospitals 
served by NSLIJHS. The students were among those at-
tending a preparatory school in Queens, New York, who 
began experiencing inﬂ  uenza-like symptoms April 22–23, 
2009 (1). Some students had recently traveled to Mexico, 
raising immediate concern about pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
(2). The following day, Saturday, April 25, an additional 67 
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persons 11–18 years of age and 16 children <8 years of age 
were evaluated in NSLIJHS emergency rooms. Over the 
next 3 days, inﬂ  uenza-related cases at NSLIJHS emergen-
cy rooms increased rapidly. Specimens from index patients 
at Long Island Jewish Medical Center on April 24–25 were 
screened for inﬂ  uenza A/B antigen, using the 3M Rapid 
Detection Flu A+B test (3M Medical Diagnostics, St. Paul, 
MN, USA). In conjunction with the New York City De-
partment of Health (DOH), the Medical Center shipped 35 
specimens with test results positive for inﬂ  uenza A to the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Testing 
at CDC conﬁ  rmed that 28 of the 35 inﬂ  uenza A–positive 
samples were inﬂ  uenza A pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (1). The 
remaining 68 samples from the Long Island Jewish Medi-
cal Center (i.e., those with negative rapid test results) were 
referred to CVL for direct ﬂ  uorescent antibody (DFA) test-
ing and viral culture, according to the usual protocol.
On Monday, April 27, 2009, an emergency operations 
status was declared for NSLIJHS. Herein, we detail the 
speciﬁ  c steps taken to increase the surge capacity at the 
NSLIJHS Central Laboratories, thereby enabling timely 
reporting of respiratory virus test results.
Standard Testing for Respiratory Viruses 
and Test Capacity
During the normal inﬂ  uenza season, the clinical lab-
oratories of NSLIJHS hospitals perform rapid inﬂ  uenza 
A+B antigen testing, using either BinaxNOW A+B test 
(Inverness, Scarborough, MA, USA) or the 3M test. Na-
sopharyngeal swab samples in Universal Transport Media 
(Diagnostic Hybrids Inc., Athens, OH, USA) and nasopha-
ryngeal wash and aspirate samples are tested. Specimens 
with test results positive for inﬂ  uenza A or B are not pro-
cessed further unless warranted by underlying patient con-
ditions. Due to the suboptimal sensitivity of rapid antigen 
tests, all samples with negative test results are forwarded 
to CVL for detection of adenovirus, human metapneumo-
virus, inﬂ  uenza A and B, parainﬂ  uenza viruses 1, 2, and 3, 
and respiratory syncytial virus by DFA testing, using D3 
Ultra Respiratory Virus reagents (Diagnostic Hybrids Inc.) 
and by rapid respiratory virus culture, using R-Mix cells 
(Diagnostic Hybrids Inc.).
NSLIJHS laboratories routinely encounter a seasonal 
increase in respiratory virus testing, peaking in mid-to-
late February and waning by May. The historic maximum 
test volume occurred in February 2008, when CVL tested 
6,021 samples and clinical laboratories system-wide per-
formed 2,901 rapid inﬂ  uenza tests, for a combined daily 
average of 308 tests. During April 1–23, 2009, CVL test-
ed 1,955 samples and clinical laboratories system-wide 
performed 676 rapid inﬂ  uenza tests, for a combined daily 
average of 119 tests. These volumes were similar to those 
for preceding years.
Molecular Detection of Respiratory Viruses
During 2008, the central NSLIJHS Molecular Diag-
nostics Laboratory performed extensive validation stud-
ies of the Luminex xTAG Respiratory Virus Panel (RVP) 
assay (Luminex Molecular Diagnostics, Toronto, Canada) 
(3,4). The version of the RVP assay that has been cleared 
by the US Food and Drug Administration detects adenovi-
rus, human metapneumovirus, parainﬂ  uenza viruses 1, 2, 
and 3, rhinovirus/enterovirus group, respiratory syncytial 
virus, and inﬂ  uenza A and B. This RVP assay can sub-
type inﬂ  uenza A as seasonal human H1 or H3 virus. The 
research-use-only version of the RVP assay also detects 
parainﬂ  uenza 4 and coronaviruses OC43, NL64, 229E, and 
HKU-1. Prior to the outbreak of pandemic (H1N1) 2009, 
the RVP assay was used for selected clinical cases and re-
search studies, with the intention of converting to use of 
the RVP assay for all respiratory virus testing during the 
off-peak 2009 summer months.
Laboratory Testing during the Novel 
Inﬂ  uenza (H1N1) Outbreak
By Monday, April 27, 2009, it was clear that an un-
usual event was occurring (5,6). Rapid inﬂ  uenza testing at 
all NSLIJHS clinical laboratories and the centralized lab-
oratories increased dramatically (Figure 1). On April 29, 
daily test volumes peaked at 903 tests, representing a 7.5× 
increase over the prior average daily volume for April and 
a sustained 3× increase over the February 2008 record daily 
volume of 308 tests.
The weekend of April 25–26, prior to declaration of a 
system-wide emergency, scheduled CVL staff responded 
with a round-the-clock effort to keep up with testing needs. 
On April 27, despite full stafﬁ  ng, considerable overtime 
was required to perform testing. On April 28, a command 
meeting was held at the NSLIJHS central laboratories to 
delineate an action plan to respond to the crisis. The major 
issues were stafﬁ  ng, testing algorithms, laboratory space, 
laboratory information systems and biostatistical reporting, 
leadership roles, and client service functions. The action 
plan was immediately authorized by system leadership. A 
key consequence of the plan was immediate deployment 
of an enhanced and diversiﬁ  ed work force, including non-
licensed support staff, licensed research staff, laboratory 
information services personnel, and biostatistical reporting 
staff. Beginning April 28, these actions enabled CVL to 
expand its weekday working hours from 6:00 AM–6:00 PM 
to 5:00 AM–1:00 AM and its weekend working hours from 
8:00 AM–4:00 PM to 6:00 AM–10:00 PM. With this personnel 
strategy, CVL was able to report DFA assay and R-Mix 
culture results on a real-time basis throughout the crisis. 
To accommodate the high volume of R-Mix cultures, CVL 
reduced the normal test algorithm of screening at 24 hours, 
48 hours, and 7 days to a single screening and conﬁ  rmatory 
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testing at 48 hours. Under these unusual circumstances, this 
change was considered acceptable as historic laboratory 
data had demonstrated that 97%–98% of all respiratory vi-
ruses are detected in 48 hours.
A second key element of the April 27–May 1 work 
week was the initiation of RVP testing for inﬂ  uenza A sub-
typing. The assay was needed to 1) identify which patients 
were possibly infected with virus subtype H1N1 rather 
than circulating seasonal H1 or H3 strains and 2) track the 
magnitude of the outbreak. By May 1, in consultation with 
the New York State and New York City DOHs, the NSLI-
JHS Molecular Diagnostics Laboratory began testing, with 
the RVP assay, the remaining samples for index patients 
screened on April 24–25 (i.e., the 68 archived samples with 
negative rapid inﬂ  uenza A/B antigen screening results) as 
well as all incoming samples with test results positive for 
inﬂ  uenza A by DFA assay and/or culture.
Due to the large volume of incoming and archived 
samples, RVP testing was prioritized for hospitalized pa-
tients, followed by persons known to be at risk as a result 
of the school exposure or recent travel to Mexico. May 2–3, 
the laboratory identiﬁ  ed, by RVP assay, 141 samples with 
nonsubtypeable inﬂ  uenza A, 78 samples with seasonal virus 
subtype H3, and 2 samples with seasonal virus subtype H1. 
Including the initial 28 samples that were sent to CDC, the 
NSLIJHS Molecular Diagnostics Laboratory had identiﬁ  ed 
169 conﬁ  rmed or probable pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases. 
On May 5, 101 samples with nonsubtypeable inﬂ  uenza A 
were tested by the New York State Wadsworth Center Lab-
oratory of Viral Diseases: 99 had test results positive for 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and 2 had inconclusive test results 
due to low virus titers (7). These data indicated that during 
the outbreak, the predictability of a nonsubtypeable inﬂ  uen-
za A virus identiﬁ  ed by RVP assay to be pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 was high (7). In July 2009, the NSLIJHS Molecular 
Diagnostics Laboratory obtained New York State approval 
to conﬁ  rm cases of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 by using the 
published CDC method. The ability to subtype inﬂ  uenza 
A, ruling out seasonal subtypes H1 and H3, and to detect 
additional respiratory viruses by RVP assay (8) within 24 
hours enabled NSLIJHS leadership to know whether high-
risk patients, inpatients, or members of the System’s work-
force had probable pandemic (H1N1) 2009.
From that point forward, the Molecular Diagnostics 
Laboratory provided RVP subtyping results (seasonal H1, 
H3, or nonsubtypeable) within 24 hours for critically im-
portant cases identiﬁ  ed by infection-control or civic au-
thorities, especially health ofﬁ  cials making public health 
decisions about regional school systems, and within 48–72 
hours for lower priority cases. The laboratory documented 
that the sensitivity of the RVP assay for detecting all inﬂ  u-
enza A types was far superior to that for other test meth-
ods (8), justifying RVP testing for admitted patients with 
negative inﬂ  uenza A/B rapid test results. This simpliﬁ  ed 
protocol was instituted May 11, 2009, in consultation with 
system and regional civic authorities.
A detailed scientiﬁ  c analysis of the virology of the 
outbreak, especially the sensitivities and speciﬁ  cities of the 
tests, is described elsewhere (8); for this publication, sum-
mary results are given. Figure 2 shows the total number of 
positive and negative RVP inﬂ  uenza A test results during 
April 24–May 15, 2009. Of the total 979 RVP test results, 
320 were negative and 677 were positive for any identiﬁ  able 
respiratory virus. A variety of viruses were identiﬁ  ed in the 
677 samples, including nonsubtypeable inﬂ  uenza A (345 
samples), seasonal inﬂ  uenza A subtype H3 (126 samples), 
seasonal inﬂ  uenza A subtype H1 (5 samples), inﬂ  uenza B (3 
samples), rhinovirus/enterovirus group (112 samples), hu-
man metapneumovirus (24 samples), parainﬂ  uenza viruses 
1–4 (40 samples), adenovirus (9 samples), coronaviruses (8 
samples), and respiratory syncytial virus (5 samples). Mul-
tiple viruses were identiﬁ  ed in 41 patients. The outbreak be-
gan to subside at the end of June 2009; 8,766 rapid inﬂ  uenza 
A tests, 8,754 rapid inﬂ  uenza B tests, 8,858 DFA assays, 
5,786 viral cultures, and 4,853 RVP assays (36.9% with 
nonsubtypeable inﬂ  uenza A results) had been performed. 
This ﬁ  nding represented a total of 34,017 tests for 11,624 
patients, a volume that would normally equal the amount of 
testing performed over a 1-year period.
Physical Plant Construction
The decision was made on April 28 to immediately 
expand the CVL into contiguous space. Although the se-
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Figure 1. Daily clinical virology test volumes in the North Shore–
Long Island Jewish Health System, New York City metropolitan 
area, USA, April 24–May 15, 2009. General clinical laboratories 
performed inﬂ   uenza A/B rapid antigen testing only. The central 
Clinical Virology Laboratory performed direct immunoﬂ  uorescence 
antibody testing and R-Mix viral culture, and beginning May 2, the 
central Molecular Diagnostics Laboratory performed molecular 
testing for respiratory viruses (xTAG Respiratory Virus Panel, 
Luminex Molecular Diagnostics, Toronto, Ontario, Canada).Laboratory Surge Response to Pandemic (H1N1) Outbreak
verity and duration of the outbreak were unknown, failure 
to be proactive in expanding the surge capacity of the labo-
ratory was unacceptable. Over 4 days, a negative-pressure 
laboratory was completed; biohazard hoods, vacuum, and 
CO2 lines were installed; incubators and ancillary equip-
ment were ordered; and a specimen-processing area with 
computer terminals was completed. The additional labora-
tory space enabled a sustained higher RVP testing capac-
ity and was well-justiﬁ  ed because the laboratory processed 
700–970 tests a day during the second wave of the outbreak 
(May 15–31).
Laboratory Information System 
and Biostatistical Reporting
The Laboratory Information System team accom-
plished the following tasks over 3 days (April 28–30): 1) 
created 2 new tests (RVP, novel H1N1 conﬁ  rmatory) and 
3 Laboratory Information System environments (Cerner 
Classic and Cerner Millennium [Cerner Corp., Kansas 
City, MO, USA] and Meditech [Medical Information 
Technology, Inc., Westwood, MA, USA]); 2) validated 
tests and billing for 11 health information systems; 3) set 
up a CVL workstation dedicated to inﬂ  uenza specimens; 
4) reported daily to infection-control and senior system 
leadership; 5) reported to the New York State DOH Elec-
tronic Clinical Laboratory reporting system; and 6) es-
tablished logic rules to automatically print positive test 
results to Client Services. The NSLIJHS Krasnoff Quality 
Management Institute provided daily biostatistical reports 
to system leadership. Data assembly was automated by 
building an Oracle database with interfaces to the Labora-
tory Information System, with crosschecking to conﬁ  rm 
the accuracy and validity of data.
Leadership and Ancillary Personnel
The medical director of CVL and the Molecular Di-
agnostics Laboratory (C.C.G.), the overall director of Sys-
tem laboratories (J.M.C.), and the chief operating ofﬁ  cer 
of System laboratories (R.S.) divided responsibilities for 
oversight of stafﬁ  ng, physical plant resources, supplies, 
the laboratory information system, courier services, and ﬁ  -
nance; for daily brieﬁ  ngs of laboratory staff, medical staff, 
infection control, and System leadership; and for DOH no-
tiﬁ  cation. This included daily system-wide conference calls 
at 7:00 AM, 3:00 PM, and 11:00 PM. A critical focus was 
the protection of the healthcare workforce and inpatients 
from nosocomial spread of pandemic (H1N1) 2009. The 
medical director reported regularly to the New York City, 
New York State, and Nassau and Suffolk County DOHs, 
keeping civic ofﬁ  cials apprised of the epidemiology of the 
outbreak.
An additional key element of the laboratory response 
was communication with physicians and patients. From 
April 27 through May 15, the central laboratories’ Cli-
ent Services, in addition to their usual 8,000–9,000 calls a 
week, handled an additional 1,000 telephone calls a week 
pertaining speciﬁ  cally to the outbreak. Laboratory leader-
ship provided scripts to Client Services, including answers 
to frequently-asked questions. Client Services made stra-
tegic calls to physician ofﬁ  ces to provide updates on test-
ing protocols and priorities. In addition, the NSLIJHS sales 
force was redirected to support physician ofﬁ  ces, including 
communication of protocols and procedures and deliveries 
of supplies.
Discussion
The fundamental role of a clinical laboratory is to pro-
vide medical care to the patient population it serves. The 
ability to respond to a speciﬁ  c crisis also provides critical 
support to civic agencies. Although our laboratory did not 
perform surge testing for the DOHs, nor was testing specif-
ically delineated between our laboratory and the DOHs, our 
ability to provide comprehensive virus testing, including 
inﬂ  uenza A subtyping, for such a large patient base (≈6.5 
million persons) indirectly assisted the DOHs by provid-
ing key diagnostic information with which the DOHs could 
make management and testing decisions.
The steps taken by our laboratory were strongly sup-
ported by system leadership and enabled NSLIJHS to suc-
cessfully meet this crisis. It is our hope that delineation of 
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Figure 2. Cumulative virology test volumes and inﬂ  uenza A–positive 
results, North Shore–Long Island Jewish Health System, New York 
City metropolitan area, USA, April 24–May 15, 2009. INFA RAP, 
rapid antigen test for inﬂ  uenza A; DFA, direct immunoﬂ  uorescent 
antibody test; VCR, rapid respiratory virus culture by R-Mix 
(Diagnostic Hybrids Inc., Athens, OH, USA); RVP, Luminex xTAG 
Respiratory Virus Panel (Luminex Molecular Diagnostics, Toronto, 
Canada). White bars, number of tests with negative results for 
inﬂ  uenza A.; black bars, number of test results positive for inﬂ  uenza 
A. Actual numbers are included above the bars. For inﬂ  uenza A, 
the percentages of samples positive for inﬂ  uenza A are shown in 
parentheses.SYNOPSIS
these steps will be valuable to other health systems and 
their laboratories because there undoubtedly will be future 
public health crises that will demand an immediate increase 
in reference laboratory testing capacity. The toll of this cri-
sis was on NSLIJHS laboratory personnel. The long hours 
required to meet testing demands were keenly felt in the 
ﬁ  rst days, when the emergency response had not been ac-
tivated. However, initial implementation of the emergency 
response only enabled us to keep up with the crisis, not go 
beyond it. Routine personnel worked extended hours, de-
spite the support of cross-covering personnel. One key rea-
son was the high level of expertise required to perform the 
virology and molecular testing; substitute personnel could 
not be deployed on short notice. The other key reason was 
the staff’s dedication and their reluctance to go off-duty. 
Management created obligatory off-duty rotations to en-
sure our work force was as rested as possible.
The major surge response stratagems, established at 
the outset, guided NSLIJHS management actions through-
out the crisis. Workforce management was top priority. 
Coordinating the System’s general laboratories with CVL, 
daily reporting of test volumes and results, and providing 
support to Client Services enabled the laboratories to re-
main in synchrony with emergency departments, hospital 
facilities, and physician practices. Also imperative was the 
need for all NSLIJHS laboratories to maintain normal op-
erations. At no time during a crisis can normal laboratory 
services undergo degradation.
Preparedness for infectious outbreaks has increasingly 
been a point of concern, owing to the threats of bioterror-
ism and natural diseases. Attention is given primarily to the 
hypothetical preparedness of ﬁ  rst responders and acute-care 
facilities, either in the form of surveys (9–12), workﬂ  ow 
analysis (13), or reviews (12,14,15). The outbreak of se-
vere acute respiratory syndrome in 2003 generated reports 
from an actual global outbreak. In Hong Kong and Toronto, 
note was made of the frustrations arising from limited ac-
cess to laboratory testing, resulting in a decreased ability 
to provide timely screening of patients for severe acute re-
spiratory syndrome (16). The ability of a laboratory to de-
ploy molecular respiratory virus testing was felt to be key 
for a successful response to an infectious disease outbreak, 
as such testing is highly sensitive, speciﬁ  c, and capable of 
high-throughput (12).
We believe that there will be future infectious out-
breaks that will strain the standing capacity of clinical 
laboratories, requiring effective implementation of surge 
capacity responses independent of public health laboratory 
support. We believe that the steps taken by NSLIJHS lab-
oratories during the initial outbreak of pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 and the lessons learned (Table) from that experience 
are of value. The exceptional 2-way interaction between the 
NSLIJHS Laboratories and the NY public health laborato-
ries was an excellent example of how sentinel laboratories 
function as a key component of the Laboratory Response 
Network system and can serve as a major support for public 
health in the time of crisis.
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Table. Lessons learned during clinical laboratory response to 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009, New York City metropolitan area, USA, 
April 24–May 15, 2009* 
The following were critical to an effective laboratory response: 
1.   Early assessment and decisive and immediate response by 
management to laboratory needs 
  Includes staffing, supplies, the LIS, physical plant, client 
relations, and local and state reporting requirements 
2.   Management of staffing needs 
  Plans for immediate cross-coverage by trained technical and 
nontechnical staff 
3. Coordination of system general laboratories 
  Standardization of testing algorithms and prioritization of 
courier delivery to central clinical virology and Molecular 
Diagnostics Laboratories 
4. Enhanced reporting 
  Verification of LIS operations for patient-based reporting 
  Communication to treating physicians 
  Daily epidemiology reports for System leadership, Infection 
Control, and hospital administrations 
  Daily contact with local civic health officials  
5. Enhanced client services 
  Increase number of staff to communicate results and respond 
to incoming calls, including scripted responses to frequently-
asked questions 
  Maintenance by sales staff of specimen-collection supplies 
and communication of guidelines for specimen procurement 
and testing to outreach physician practices 
6. Public relations oversight
  Communications to news agencies were restricted to the 
System’s public relations office 
*LIS, Laboratory Information Systems; System, North Shore–Long Island 
Jewish Health System.Laboratory Surge Response to Pandemic (H1N1) Outbreak
our laboratory and NSLIJHS for the duration of this inﬂ  uenza 
outbreak. 
C.C.G. acknowledges funding support from the United States 
Department of Defense Award W81XWH-08-1-0477. 
Dr Crawford is senior vice president for laboratory services 
and chair of the Department of Pathology and Laboratory Medi-
cine for the North Shore–Long Island Jewish Health System. His 
primary research interest is advancing the role that pathology 
plays in public health and national healthcare reform.
References
  1.   Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Swine-origin inﬂ  uenza 
A (H1N1) virus infections in a school⎯New York City, May 2009. 
MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2009;58:470–2.
  2.   Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Outbreak of swine-
origin inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) virus infection⎯Mexico, March–April 
2009. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2009;58:467–70.
  3.   Mahony J, Chong S, Merante F, Yaghoubian S, Sinha T, Lisle C, 
et al. Development of a respiratory virus panel test for detection of 
twenty human respiratory viruses by use of multiplex PCR and a 
ﬂ  uid microbead-based assay. J Clin Microbiol. 2007;45:2965–70. 
DOI: 10.1128/JCM.02436-06
  4.   Merante F, Yaghoubian S, Janeczko R. Principles of the xTAG Respi-
ratory Viral Panel assay (RVP assay). J Clin Virol. 2007;40:S31–5. 
DOI: 10.1016/S1386-6532(07)70007-0
  5.   Novel Swine-Origin Inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) Virus Investigation Team. 
Emergence of a novel swine-origin inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) virus in 
humans. N Engl J Med. 2009;360:2605–15. DOI: 10.1056/NEJ-
Moa0903810
  6.   Shinde V, Bridges CB, Uyeki TM, Shu B, Balish A, Xu X, et al. 
Triple-reassortment swine inﬂ  uenza A (H1) in humans in the Unit-
ed States, 2005–2009. N Engl J Med. 2009;360:2616–25. DOI: 
10.1056/NEJMoa0903812
  7.   Ginocchio CC, St George K. Likelihood that an unsubtypeable In-
ﬂ  uenza A result in the Luminex xTAG Respiratory Virus Panel is 
indicative of novel A/H1N1 (swine-like) inﬂ  uenza. J Clin Microbiol. 
2009;47:2347–8. DOI: 10.1128/JCM.01027-09
  8.   Ginocchio CC, Zhang F, Manji R, Arora S, Bornfreund M, Falk L, et 
al. Evaluation of multiple test methods for the detection of the novel 
2009 inﬂ  uenza A (H1N1) during the New York City outbreak. J Clin 
Virol. 2009;45:191–5. DOI: 10.1016/j.jcv.2009.06.005
  9.   Hartocollis A. At the hospital, the faces of fear and swine ﬂ  u. The 
New York Times. 2009 May 22;Sect. A:21.
10.   Ippolito G, Puro V, Heptonstall J. Hospital preparedness to bioter-
rorism and other infectious disease emergencies. Cell Mol Life Sci. 
2006;63:2213–22. DOI: 10.1007/s00018-006-6309-y
11.   Kaji AH, Lewis RJ. Hospital disaster preparedness in Los Angeles 
County. Acad Emerg Med. 2006;13:1198–203. DOI: 10.1111/j.1553-
2712.2006.tb01648.x
12.   Rebmann T, Carrico R, English JF. Hospital infectious disease emer-
gency preparedness: a survey of infection control professionals. Am 
J Infect Control. 2007;35:25–32. DOI: 10.1016/j.ajic.2006.07.002
13.   Li H, McCormac MA, Estes RW, Sefers SE, Dare RK, Chappell JD, 
et al. Simultaneous detection and high-throughput identiﬁ  cation of 
a panel of RNA viruses causing respiratory tract infections. J Clin 
Microbiol. 2007;45:2105–9. DOI: 10.1128/JCM.00210-07
14.    Schultz CH, Koenig KL. State of research in high-consequence 
hospital surge capacity. Acad Emerg Med. 2006;13:1153–6. DOI: 
10.1111/j.1553-2712.2006.tb01640.x
15.   Pasick J, Robinson J, Hooper-McGrevy K, Wright P, Kitching P, 
Handel K, et al. The roles of national and provincial diagnostic labo-
ratories in the eradication of highly pathogenic H7N3 avian inﬂ  uen-
za virus from the Fraser Valley of British Columbia, Canada. Avian 
Dis. 2007;51(Supp 1):309–12. DOI: 10.1637/7566-033106R1.1
16.   Wong WC, Wong SY, Lee A, Goggins WB. How to provide an ef-
fective primary health care in ﬁ  ghting against severe acute respira-
tory syndrome: the experiences of two cities. Am J Infect Control. 
2007;35:50–5. DOI: 10.1016/j.ajic.2006.06.009
Address for correspondence: Christine C. Ginocchio, North Shore–Long 
Island Jewish Health System Laboratories, 10 Nevada Dr, Lake Success, 
NY 11042-1114, USA; e-mail: cginocch@nshs.edu
  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 16, No. 1, January 2010  13 
The opinions expressed by authors contributing to this journal do 
not necessarily reﬂ  ect the opinions of the Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention or the institutions with which the authors are 
afﬁ  liated.